Malayan Emergency (1948-60)

The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960)

(A lecture given by Seumas Tan on 5th May 2018

at the Military History Society of NSW)

The Malayan Emergency or “Darurat Malaya” in Malaya was formally declared in 1948 by the British. However, in actual fact the insurgency happened a lot earlier than that. In order to understand the insurgency, we need to look at who were the early insurgents?

The Early Insurgents

The early insurgents in Malaya were mainly made up of ethnic Chinese who all had one thing in common - they were all anti-Japanese. Strong anti-Japanese sentiment could be felt in Malaya as early as 1930s when the Japanese Imperial Army invaded Manchuria. There were many anti-Japanese activists during that period and amongst them was my grandfather, Tan Jin Ko.

Tan Jin Ko

 Tan Jin Ko - my grandfather

Tan Jin Ko was a Chinese community leader and the President of the Hainanese Association. He came to Malaya as a stowaway from the island of Hainan in China at a very young age. He didn’t have much education but he had a gift - he was a natural linguist who could picked up languages quite easily. He taught himself to speak the Malay language (the local language in Malaya / Malaysia) and was able to read and write “Jawi” (Arabic scripts). Due to the fact that he was able to communicate well with the local Malay community, he got a job in the “istana” (palace) working for the Sultan of Selangor (one of the state Rulers in Malaya / Malaysia). He became the Sultan of Selangor’s personal driver and mechanic. Due to his close relationship with the Sultan, he also became an unofficial interlocutor between the Palace and the Chinese community.

When the anti-Japanese sentiment began to spread to Malaya, my grandfather who by then had become a Chinese community leader was very active in raising funds to support the resistant fighters in China. Unfortunately for him, when the Japanese occupied Malaya, he was betrayed by a member of the community. He was detained and tortured by the Kempetai. He had never fully recovered from the injuries and died after the War. Tan Jin Ko wasn’t a Communist member but he had the same anti-Japanese sentiment as the Communist members in Malaya at that time.

The early insurgents were patriots

The early insurgents were trained by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) led by Colonel Freddy Spencer Chapman (author of “Jungle is Neutral”) who was part of the “stay behind force” in Malaya. The objective of the “stay behind force” was to train and assist the resistant fighters after the fall of Malaya to the Japanese Imperial Army. The majority of the resistant fighters were from the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). They were trained in sabotage and guerrilla warfare which proved to be useful to the insurgents later on. They used these skills extensively against the Malayan Government during the Emergency.

The resistant fighters formed the “Malayan People Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA)” which later evolved and became the “Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA)”. The MNLA was the military arm of the CPM. The MPAJA was highly looked upon by the British army. One British General described the MPAJA as “disciplined people who had great seriousness of purpose”.

Besides the MPAJA, there was another group of resistant in Malaya known as Force 136. Force 136 in Malaya was formed by John Davis and Lim Bo Seng (a hero to many Singaporeans until today). Many people see Force 136 as guerrilla fighters but in actual fact, they were not. It is my personal opinion that the Force 136 acted more like an intelligence unit that was set up to gather information, recruit informants, provide logistics support and to encourage resistant against the Japanese Imperial Army. Interestingly enough, the members of Force 136 were not referred to as soldiers or fighters, they were simply referred to as agents. The MPAJA worked closely with Force 136 throughout the Malayan Campaign.

End of Japanese Occupation

When the Japanese surrendered on 15/08/1945, an “interregnum” followed in Malaya. An “interregnum” here would be the period between the time the Japanese surrendered and when the British Military Administration (BMA) took over. During this period of uncertainty, the “law of the jungle” came into force. The MPAJA was busy seizing controls of territory across Malaya and punishing “collaborators” of the Japanese regime. Eyewitnesses mentioned that the MPAJA was even more ruthless than the Japanese. Racial tension was also high because many local Malays who worked for the Japanese were summarily executed by the MPAJA.

Return of British Rule

The British formally took control of Malaya on 12/09/1945. The British army knew about MPAJA’s actions but chose not to take action against the MPAJA. Instead they restricted the MPAJA to certain areas. There could be a number of reasons as to why the British chose not to take action against the MPAJA. It is my personal opinion that the British at that time still viewed the MPAJA as a “friendly force”, therefore, they didn’t want to start another conflict so early as the Malayan Campaign had just ended. They allowed MPAJA to remain armed until negotiations were finalised for their disarmament.

Disbandment of MPAJA

The MPAJA was formally dissolved on 01/12/1945. A gratuity sum of $350.00 (Malayan dollars), which was a lot of money then, was paid to each disbanded member of the MPAJA. The disbanded member was also given the option to join civilian employment or to join the Police or the local Regiment. A total of 5,947 weapons were handed in by 6,800 guerrillas. However many of those who surrendered the weapons were not Communists but people who had resentment towards the Japanese. The British became suspicious when they examined the surrendered weapons and discovered that the weapons were in actual fact, old weapons. This suspicion was confirmed when one day the British army while in its routine patrol stumbled upon an armed Chinese settlement. The Chinese insurgents immediately fired at the British. One of the Chinese insurgents was killed in the incident. It is my humble opinion that if it had been one of the British soldiers killed, the Emergency would have been declared much earlier.

The mindset of the insurgents - why were they creating havoc?

Many people would think that when the War had ended, peace would be restored and there would not be any further conflict or suffering. Unfortunately, when it came to Malaya, the Communist had different ideas. Based on my research, I would submit the following as to why the Communist wanted to create disturbance in Malaya:

1.     The Communists were anti-Colonial. They did not like their country occupied by another country. First it was the Japanese and now the British. The little “freedom” that they enjoyed during the “interregnum” had come to an end when the British returned to Malaya.

2.     The Communists felt that they should be rewarded and given a bigger role in governing the Country as they were the ones that helped the British to defeat the Japanese.

3.     The Communists believed they had the support from the locals in getting rid of the British. The Communists thought the strong support that they received from the locals during the Japanese occupation would also apply to the British occupation of Malaya.

4.     The Communists wanted to create an incident that would show the British that the Communist was a force to be taken seriously, thus we have the first incident that led to the declaration of Emergency.

The First Incident - The Sungai Siput incident (Elphil Estate)

The first shots of the Malayan Emergency were fired at 8.30am on 16/06/1948 at Elphil Estate. Three European planters were killed. They were Arthur Walker (50 years, manager of the Estate), John Allison (55 years) and Ian Christian (believed to be in his early 20s). They were executed by 3 young Chinese insurgents. Two days later (18/06/1948), the British declared Emergency in Malaya and the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) was outlawed. The Police was given power to arrest and detain the Communists.

On January 1949, the CPM formed the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) and started guerrilla warfare which they learned from the British SOE during WWII. The guerrilla warfare involved guerrilla tactics, sabotaging installations, attacking rubber plantations and destroying transportation and infrastructures. The CPM was led by the Secretary General, Chin Peng.

Chin Peng

Also known as Ong Boon Hua was born in Sitiawan, Malaya. He was awarded the Burma Star and the OBE but the awards were revoked later on. From a hero during the Malayan Campaign, Chin Peng became “Public Enemy No. 1” after the War. Chin Peng was described as a ruthless person and the brain behind the CPM and the insurgents.

Interestingly enough, Chin Peng did not start out as a Communist. He started as an anti-Japanese activist during the Malayan Campaign. Contrary to what most believed, Chin Peng was not educated in Chinese but was in fact, educated in English. It was reported that he was given the opportunity to continue his further education in Chinese in Singapore but he refused. Instead, he opted to stay on in Malaya to continue his education in English.

Chin Peng was admitted as a member of the CPM in January 1940. He received training in guerrilla warfare from the British SOE and because he spoke English well, he became a liaison officer between the MPAJA and the British Military in South East Asia.

I have never met Chin Peng in real life but my former colleague did. He was Chin Peng’s lawyer when Chin Peng filed an application in Court to challenge the Malaysian Government’s decision to bar him from returning to Malaysia. When I asked my colleague, “what was Chin Peng like as a person?” My colleague replied, “He is like an old Uncle. A polite, friendly and soft-spoken man”. My colleague’s description of him was very different from the person I read about in history books. In history books, he was described as ruthless and merciless.

When the attack from the insurgents became more rampant, more brutal and more aggressive, the British had to react fast and that was when they brought in Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs.

Sir Harold Briggs / Briggs Plan

Sir Harold Briggs was a British Senior Military Officer who served in WWI and WWII. He was well liked by Field Marshall William Slim who described him as a “good commander who made very few mistakes”. Sir Harold Briggs retired in 1948 but was recalled to resume active duty by Sir William Slim who was then the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Sir Harold Briggs was appointed as the Director of the Operations in Malaya to fight against the Communists. He created what was known as the Briggs Plan.

The objective of the Briggs Plan was to cut-off the insurgents’ resources that came mainly from civilian support (Communist’s sympathisers). In order to do this, Briggs introduced the following:

1.    Briggs created “New Villages” (it’s known as “Sin Choon” in the Hokkien Chinese dialect). The objective was to separate and isolate the Communist’s sympathisers from the insurgents. The creation of “New Villages” was very effective as the Government managed to cut the supply of food and intelligence given by the Communist’s sympathisers to the insurgents. Many years later even Chin Peng admitted that the Communists were starving when Briggs Plan was implemented. Any area that had Communist activities or believed to have Communist supporters would be classified as a “Black area”. The area would be reclassified as a “White area” when there were no longer any Communist activities or supporters.

2.     Briggs introduced Identity Cards (IC) for all Malayans. The purpose of the IC was to distinguish between bona fide Malayans and the insurgents. The early IC had the particulars of the card holder and his/her thumbprints. Today, Malaysians still carry their ICs wherever they go. The IC today is much more sophisticated that has an embedded chip that contains encrypted information and the IC can also be used as a debit card.

Even though, the Briggs Plan was introduced by Sir Harold Briggs but it was in fact implemented by Field Marshall Sir Gerald Templer. The reason was because Sir Harold Briggs became sick and had to return to UK. Sir Harold Briggs died in Cyprus in 1952.

Field Marshall Sir Gerald Temple

Sir Gerald Templer had a distinguished military career and subsequently became the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (1955-58) after serving in Malaya as the British High Commissioner from 1952 till 1954. The role of the British High Commissioner in Malaya then was not the same as the role of the British High Commissioner as we know today. The British High Commissioner then was basically the defecto Head of State with wide executive powers. The reason the British gave the name “High Commissioner” and not as “Head of State” was because they didn’t want the title to be seen as usurping the status of the Sultans in the Malay States.

Sir Gerald Templer was a brilliant commander who looked at things from different angles. He was the one who successfully implemented the Briggs Plan and added his own aggressive strategies. He used psychological warfare where he was reported to say, “The answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people”. It was reported that in “winning the hearts” of the people, Templer himself learned the local language and culture to gain the support of the people. Templer demanded that the newly built villages where the ethnic Chinese settled away from the jungles (ie: away from the Communists) should look more inviting rather like detention camps. To further gain the “hearts and souls” of the non-Malays, Templer fought hard to grant Malayan citizenship to over 2.6 million Malayan residents, of which 1.1 million were Chinese. Templer wanted to seek “political and social equality for all Malayans”, something which the CPM wanted to do.

In order to flush out the insurgents, Templer introduced incentive schemes for rebels who surrendered. At the same time, Templer also took drastic steps to fight insurgency by imposing strict curfews and tight control of food supplies. Templer ordered that all crops grown by the Communists to be sprayed with herbicide and destroyed. The methods carried out by Templer were effective as the CPM relocated its headquarters to Belong, South Thailand in 1953.

When Templer left Malaya in 1954, the situation had stabilised. However, Templer did not allow complacency to occur in his Army and the Government. Before Templer left Malaya, he declared, “I will shoot the bastard who says the Emergency is over”. One of the main reasons why Templer was brought into Malaya as the British High Commissioner was because of a very dark event that took place earlier - the assassination of Sir Henry Gurney.

The assassination of Sir Henry Gurney

Sir Henry Gurney was more of a civil servant rather than a soldier. He was a Colonial British administrator. Sir Henry Gurney was appointed as the British High Commissioner in Malaya on 01/10/1948 which was barely a few months after the Emergency was declared. He was assassinated on 06/07/1951 while on the way to Fraser’s Hill. Fraser’s Hill is a beautiful hill resort which is about 2 hours drive from Kuala Lumpur. Sir Henry Gurney was travelling in his official car (a Rolls Royce Silver Wreath) with his wife, private secretary Dennis Staple and a local Malay driver. His car was escorted by a Land Rover with 6 Malayan policemen sitting at the back, a police radio van and an armoured scout car. There was a total of 13 policemen led by a senior British police officer by the name of PM Brodie. They were equipped with one Bren, .303 rifles and revolvers. While on the journey to Fraser’s Hill, the police radio van broke down. Henry Gurney insisted that they would proceed without the police radio van. The Rolls Royce and the Land Rover went ahead leaving behind the armoured vehicle and the police radio van. By the time, the armoured vehicle caught up (PM Brodie estimated it was 2 to 3 minutes later), the ambush had already occurred. Five of the six Malayan policemen were wounded and the driver was killed.

Henry Gurney saved his wife by pushing her down from the seat. He opened the door and walked towards where the guerrillas were firing. In other words, he sacrificed himself for the safety of his wife and those in the car. Henry Gurney thought the Communists were aiming for him but in truth, the Communists didn’t even know that Henry Gurney would be travelling to Fraser’s Hill on that day. Their initial objective was to ambush supply trucks, looking for food and supply but when they saw the Rolls Royce approaching with its Union Jack flag waving, the Communists knew they hit the “jackpot”.

The assassination of Henry Gurney had shocked everyone, especially the British. This led them to bring in Field Marshall Sir Gerald Templer as the new British High Commissioner in Malaya. Due to the effectiveness of Gerald Templer’s methods, the CPM wanted to seek a peace negotiation which led to the “Baling Talks”.

The Baling Talks 1955

Apart from the effectiveness of Templer’s methods, the CPM realised that the local Malayan politicians had achieved more for the independence movement since 1948 than CPM. There was also a reduction in support from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the then Soviet Union who viewed the armed struggle in Malaya as untenable. This led to Chin Peng writing to Tunku Abdul Rahman who had at that time just been elected as the Chief Minister of Malaya. The Tunku (as he was fondly known) subsequently became the first Prime Minister of Malaysia and is known as the “Father of Independence”.

Two preliminary meetings (similar to the preparation of the inter-Korea summit recently held on 27/04/2018) were held to prepare for the actual Peace Talks. The following were agreed by both the Government and the CPM:

1.     That the Peace Talks would commence on 28/12/1955 at a local school in a place called Baling.

2.     The security procedures to be applied- the Government would secure an area called Gunung Paku for Chin Peng and his delegation to reside for the entire duration of the negotiation. Gunung Paku is near to the venue where the Peace Talks would be held. The Government was also responsible to bring Chin Peng and his delegation safely to Baling and then to return them to Gunung Paku upon the termination of the Talks.

3.     The Government had agreed to give CPM an amnesty for the duration of the talk and for a 10 day period following cessation of the talks should they fail. A guarantee was given that the Communists would not be pursued until the period had elapsed.

4.     The Government had agreed to supply Chin Peng and his delegation with daily rations such as rice, sugar and the usual army rations for the period of the talks and 10 days after that.

John Davis (formerly from Force 136) whom Chin Peng trusted and knew from the Malayan Campaign would be used as an “insurance” to ensure Chin Peng’s safety. John Davis had escorted Chin Peng out from the jungle to attend the Peace Talks. He stayed overnight with Chin Peng and even accompanied Chin Peng some distance into the jungle when the talk failed. This gave Chin Peng some comfort  that the British was not going to shoot him when the Peace talk failed. There was a strong trust and bond between both of them. This trust and bond did not only exist between Chin Peng and John Davis but also with Colonel Spencer Chapman. Jolly Cho who secretly supplied Spencer Chapman with food during the War once told my father that when he visited Spencer Chapman in the UK after the War, he asked Chapman if he would come back to Malaya and fight against the Communists. Spencer Chapman’s reply was that “I cannot fight against the people that I fought with during the War”. There was certainly greatly loyalty amongst comrades, whichever side they may be in.

The Peace Talk took place on 28/12/1955 at a Government English School in Baling. The talk lasted more than 8 hours which was spread over 2 days. The CPM was represented by Chin Peng, Rashid Maidin (the Malay representative of CPM) and Chen Tien (head of CPM’s Central Propaganda Department). The Government was represented by Tunku Abdul Rahman (Chief Minister of Malaya), Tan Cheng Lock (President of the Malayan Chinese Association) and David Marshall (Chief Minister of Singapore). Based on my experience in dispute resolution, allow me to give my analysis on the Baling Talks:

1. Common ground: In dispute resolution, we always seek common ground where both parties can agree either on an idea, belief, issue or subject. In the Baling Talks, Tunku Abdul Rahman started well by saying “colonialism must end and that this Country must be given freedom”. The Communist shared the same belief as the Tunku. The Tunku then went on to say that he is not a “spokesman for the British Government or a running dog”. He called himself as the “servant of the people”. This further endeared him to the Communist.

2. Know your opponent: One of the important things in dispute resolution is always know who are your opponents. Things started to go downhill, when the Tunku started talking   about democracy and praised his political party for fighting for independence without resorting to physical conflict. The Tunku had urged the CPM to accept the amnesty so that everyone would be pardoned. It is my personal opinion that whenever someone starts preaching democracy to a hardcore Communist, the person should know that he/she would be in trouble. Whatever rapport the person had built earlier would have gone down the drain.

Chin Peng explained he had not come to argue questions of ideology but to seek peace. Chin Peng explained the CPM rejected the amnesty because it did not permit the Communists to “enjoy equal status” where the Communists would be able to fight for independence by Constitutional means. The Tunku replied that the amnesty was to help the Communists to “regain their normal position in Society” and nothing more.

There was one important question asked by Chin Peng that I felt was to test the Tunku’s allegiance to the British. The question posed to the Tunku was “whether any decisions made at the meeting need to be approved by the British Government?”. If the Tunku replied, “yes”, then it would be clear that Tunku was still subservient to the British Government but if Tunku said, “no”, then this would prove that the Tunku’s Government could indeed act independently. The Tunku’s actual reply was “If I decide and Mr. Marshall (Chief Minister of Singapore) agrees with me, that will be all”.

The sticky point in the Baling Talks was the recognition of CPM which the Communist wanted but rejected by the Government. Ultimately, the talk failed. Chin Peng and his delegation had to return to the jungle accompanied by John Davis. Dennis Wombell (a former Platoon Commander 2, Police Field Force) in his diary noted that he saw Chin Peng walking towards the border of South Thailand. He made a note to himself that this is where he is going to hunt Chin Peng after the amnesty period had ended.

Subsequently, the CPM had requested for more negotiations but this was rejected by the Government. When Malaya achieved its independence on 31/08/157, the support for the CPM had already dwindled.

The Bukit Kepong incident (“The Malayan Alamo”)

The Bukit Kepong incident also known as “the Malayan Alamo” took place on 23/02/1950 between the Malayan Police and the CPM. Bukit Kepong was a small remote village located in the state of Johor. It comes under the district of Pagoh which consists of a collection of towns and villages. At that time, Bukit Kepong had a small wooden police station with a strength of 25 policemen including auxiliary policemen (part-time policemen). The police team was headed by one Sergeant Jamil Mohd Shah (No. 3493).

The battle began at 4.15am where the Police were attacked by 180 insurgents led by Muhammad Indera. The Police were outnumbered and outgunned by the Communists (automatic weapons vs rifles and shotguns). The insurgents had repeatedly asked Sergeant Jamil to raise a white flag and surrender but he refused. As a result, 25 people from the Police Station were killed against 40 insurgents who perished in that massacre. The 25 people comprised of 14 policemen, 2 civilians, 5 auxiliary policemen, 2 ladies who were wives of the policemen (the wives were executed in cold blood) and 2 children. The Police Station was burned down by the insurgents. Some of the people from the other villages tried to help but to no avail.

The OCPD (Officer in Charge of the Police District) of Pagoh at that time was JJ Raj Jr,  who later became a Commissioner of Police and was bestowed the title “Tan Sri” (an equivalent of a Lordship in the UK) by the Yang DiPertuan Agong (the Monarch and Head of State of Malaysia). Some people have questioned whether the OCPD of Pagoh could have done more to protect Bukit Kepong. My reply to those people is that I have known Commissioner of Police (Rtd) JJ Raj Jr for many years and I had the privilege of serving with him in the Council of the National Shooting Association of Malaysia for 20 years. I am proud to have him as a colleague and a friend because he is an honourable man full of integrity and great leadership. We must also keep in mind, that JJ Raj Jr was made an OCPD in 1950 when such senior position in the Police Force was rarely given to an Asian. His capabilities must have impressed the British Officers who put their trust in his leadership and decision making. I have no doubt whatsoever that if he had to give his life to defend Bukit Kepong, he would. I visited Commissioner of Police (Rtd) JJ Raj Jr in his home recently (Dec 2017). He is now 96 years old and I took the opportunity to ask him about the Bukit Kepong incident. He agreed to share with me his recollection of the incident.

10.      Recollection from Commissioner of Police (Rtd) JJ Raj Jr

Commissioner of Police (Rtd) Tan Sri JJ Raj Jr and me

 Commissioner of Police (Rtd) JJ Raj Jr related the following to me:

At that time, I was the OCPD of Pagoh district. The police received intelligence that the Communist wanted to take over a police station to boost the morale of its people. At that time, the Communist took a heavy beating, therefore, they wanted to create an impact to show that they were still a force to be taken seriously. At the meeting with the Johor State Police Chief, we looked at a number of possible police stations that might be attack by the Communist. Bukit Kepong wasn’t one of them because it was too isolated and remote. We felt it wasn’t important enough to the Communist. However after the meeting, while in my car back to the office, I felt uneasy and needed to visit Bukit Kepong. I went the next day with a squad of 1 Corporal and 9 Constables.

We travelled in a truck along the winding road of Lenga (a small town) and then proceeded in a police marine boat to Bukit Kepong. It took us about 3 1/2 hours from the Pagoh Police Headquarters to Bukit Kepong. I later learned (after the Bukit Kepong incident) that the Communist insurgents saw me and my squad in the boat but for some reason, they didn’t fire at us. It would have been easier if they would have fired at us and leave Bukit Kepong alone. Upon arriving at Bukit Kepong, I inspected the security in the area and was satisfied with the overall arrangement.

I asked JJ Raj Jr what he thought of Sergeant Jamil who was featured as a hero in many local history books. He replied, “He was just an ordinary policeman. When I met him, there wasn’t anything special or significant that stood out that made me take notice of him. A very unassuming fellow. However something that struck me rather strange on that day was that as I was leaving, they (the Bukit Kepong Police team) came to the jetty to see me off. I told Sergeant Jamil, “Berjaga-jaga” when means “be careful” in Malay. Sergeant Jamil replied in Malay “Biar putih tulang jangan putih mata”. It is a Malay idiom which means “Death before dishonour”. He gave me a smart salute for a very long time which I found rather strange. That was the last I have seen Sergeant Jamil. The attack of Bukit Kepong happened later that night. The last survivor of the actual Bukit Kepong attack died 2 years ago. I am now the only one left who had ties to the incident”.

Even though, the Malayan Emergency was declared as over in 1960 but the fight against the Communist insurgents did not end there. It only ended in 1989.

Peace Agreement of Hat Yai (1989)

The Peace Accord was signed on 02/12/1989 signifying the end of the Communist Insurgency in Malaya. The Peace Agreement was signed by the CPM because the CPM’s position by then had weakened (no more issues to pursue) plus they suffered heavy losses, therefore, they were forced to negotiate.

The deal was brokered by the Thai authorities as most of the CPM members were living in Southern Thailand. The Peace Agreement requires the CPM to cease military authority, destroy the weapon and pledge loyalty to the Yang DiPertuan Agong (Malaysian King). Only 330 former CPM members were allowed to return to Malaysia even though the Accord provides the Government’s guarantee of safe return to Malaysia for those who lay down their arms peacefully. After 40 years, 5 months and 26 days, the CPM insurgency finally had come to an end.

Reference and further reading:

R. Thambipillay, The Last Post - Story of the Emergency & Commemorative Events (1948-1960), published by R. Thambipillay (2011)

Margaret Shennan, Our Man in Malaya - John Davis CBE DSO, SOE Force 136 and Postwar Counter-Insurgency, published by Monsoon Books Singapore (2014)

Chin Peng, My Side of History, published by Media Master Singapore (2013)

J.J. Raj Jr, The War Years and After, published by Pelanduk Publications, Malaysia (1995)